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1. Background and Introduction 
Integrated water resource management (IWRM) and organizing it primarily at the river 
basin level are two of the most common and widely repeated recommendations in the 
water resources literature of the last decade if not longer (Allee 1988; Galloway 1997; 
McDonald and Kay 1988; World Bank 1993).  Basin management is often associated 
with the concept of decentralization, of managing water resources at the “lowest 
appropriate level.” (See, e.g., International Conference on Water and the Environment 
1992; Mody 2001.)  Several conceptual arguments have been presented in favor of 
decentralization in water resource management, and basin-level management in 
particular: that the whole array of resources and use patterns in the basin will be taken 
into account, public participation will be greater and broader, management decisions will 
be based on better knowledge of local conditions, and so on. 
    Empirical studies of river basin management systems provide opportunities to 
examine the claims made for basin-level integrated resources management, and to 
explore factors that appear to influence its implementation and outcomes.  In this research 
project, with the support of the World Bank, the project team has searched for those 
factors and their relationships to river basin management in two ways: with a survey of 
river basin organizations throughout the world, and with case studies of eight river basins 
analyzed in greater detail.  Some of those eight cases have emerged recently, as in the 
Warta River basin of Poland and the Fraser River basin of Canada.  Others have long 
histories of basin-scale institutions, such as the Guadalquivir River basin in Spain and the 
Murray-Darling Basin in Australia. 
This paper focuses on analysis of the evolution and current status of river basin 
management institutions in the Murray-Darling Basin.  Only brief descriptions of the 
basin’s physical characteristics, social and economic profile, and historical development 
are included in this paper. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
To analyze the data gathered for this project from the case studies and from the survey of 
river basin organizations, the project team has developed a framework that identifies a 
number of political and institutional factors which may be associated with the emergence, 
sustainability, and success or failure of decentralized approaches to integrated water 
resource management at the basin scale.  These factors, and their hypothesized 
relationships with basin management in a country that has decentralized or is attempting 
to decentralize water resource management institutions, are derived from the institutional 
analysis literature relating to water or other natural resource management and to 
decentralized systems (especially Ostrom 1990, 1992; also Agrawal 2000; Alaerts 1999; 
Blomquist and Schlager 1999; Bromley 1999; Easter and Hearne 1993; Wunsch 1991). 
Our information gathering and analysis focuses on the following sets of variables. 
 
  Contextual factors and initial conditions 
  Characteristics of the decentralization process 
  Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
  The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements   5
Variables considered within each set are listed in the appendix.  The Murray-




We pursued a case study approach for this project in order to examine closely the 
processes of institutional change as well as the current situation.   A site visit was 
facilitated by an expert and active participant in water policy and management who 
arranged interviews and prepared a background paper on the basin prior to the visit 
(Haisman 2003).  Background papers for all case study visits are based on a common 
outline.  During the site visit, team members met with and interviewed 20 individuals, 
including basin-level stakeholders, past and current central and local government 
officials, past and current Murray-Darling Basin Commission staff and members, and 
academic researchers with perspectives on government structure and water management 
in Australia.
2  The interviews were focused on understanding the processes of 
institutional origin and change and the performance of water management institutions at 
sub-basin, basin, state, and national scales, matters that were closely within the 
knowledge of the interviewees.  After the visit, team members combined their notes from 
the interviews, revisited and revised the basin background paper, reviewed other 
materials, and composed this paper summarizing and analyzing the river basin 
management situation in the Murray-Darling Basin. 
    The following analysis of the Murray-Darling case is therefore based on a 
combination of sources—documentary materials on the basin and the various 
governmental and non-governmental organizations at work there, the background paper 
prepared for the visit, and the interviews conducted during the site visit.  The findings 
and conclusions therefore do not represent the point of view of a single individual or 
organization, but emerge from a composite of data collected and reviewed by the research 
project team. 
 
4. The Murray-Darling Basin 
Water resources are a major public issue in Australia because of their scarcity and 
extreme variability.  Although the coastal fringes are relatively well endowed with water, 
and are therefore where most of the population resides, the interior is arid and water is 
very scarce, making Australia the driest inhabited continent on Earth.  The Murray-
Darling Basin
3 is an interior basin, taking its name from two dominant rivers, the Murray 
                                                 
2 Organizations from which individuals were interviewed were the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, Government of Australia; Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Government of 
Australia; the Murray-Darling Basin Commission; Murray-Darling Basin Community Advisory 
Committee; River Murray Water; Department of Infrastructure, Planning, and Natural Resources, 
Government of New South Wales; Department of Sustainability and Environment, Government of Victoria; 
Albury Water; Goulburn Valley Water; Goulburn-Murray Water; Murray Irrigation Limited; Goulburn 
Broken Catchment Management Authority; Broken Catchment Committee; Australian National Committee 
on Irrigation and Drainage; Water Services Association of Australia; Victorian Water Industry Association; 
and Victorian Farmers Federation. 
3 See map at the beginning of the paper.   6
and the Darling.  It is defined by the catchment areas of the Murray and Darling Rivers 
and their many tributaries. 
The Murray-Darling Basin lies to the west of the Great Dividing Range which 
runs the length of the east coast of Australia.  The Basin extends across much of 
southeastern Australia, with the mouth of the Murray River on the southern coast of 
Australia near Adelaide.  It includes over one million square kilometers, and about one-
seventh of the land area of Australia.  The Basin extends to over three-quarters of the 
State of New South Wales (NSW), more than half of State of Victoria, significant 
portions of the States of Queensland and South Australia and includes the whole of the 
Australian Capital Territory.  Well over half of the Basin is in NSW and almost a quarter 
is in Queensland. 
The Basin contains more than 20 major rivers as well as important groundwater 
systems.  It is also an important source of freshwater for domestic consumption, 
agricultural production and industry. 
The rivers of the Murray-Darling Basin are characterized by flat gradients (much 
of the basin is less than 200 meters above sea level), highly variable flows, and limited 
runoff.  Average annual runoff is some 24 million cubic meters (m
3) of which around half 
is lost to natural processes.  Total runoff is the lowest of any of the world’s major basins 
and average annual flow to the sea is a mere 400 m
3 per second.  Much of the Basin is 
semi-arid and some 86% of the area contributes no runoff.  The Basin covers 14% of 
Australia but receives only 6.1% of Australia’s mean annual runoff (Goss 2003: 1). 
Wetlands systems play an important role for rivers in the Basin.  There are about 
30,000 wetlands in the Basin, with 11 being listed for their internationally significant 
environmental values.  The wetlands are major considerations in environmental 
management of the rivers. 
The water resources of the Basin are now highly developed.  Annual diversions 
from the river system are 11.43 million m
3, 96% of which is for irrigation (Goss 2003: 1).  
Total water storage capacity in the Basin is 34.7 million m
3, which supports some 
1,470,000 hectares of irrigated crops and pastures in the Basin (representing 71 percent of 
Australia’s total area of irrigated crops and pastures). 
In 1996 the Basin was home to nearly 2 million people (or about 11% of the total 
Australian population) and another million people outside the Basin were heavily 
dependent upon the Basin’s water resources.  The Basin boasts a gross value of 
production of over A$23 billion, of which approximately A$4.5 billion is generated by 
irrigated agriculture.  Around 40 percent of Australia’s gross value of agricultural 
production originates from the Murray-Darling Basin. 
 
5. Basin Management Issues and Stakeholders 
In light of the high degree of development of water use in the Basin, the dominant basin 
management issues of the 20
th century were water scarcity, over-allocation of water 
supplies,
4 and drought exposure.  These issues stimulated the development of institutional 
arrangements in the Basin from the beginning of the 20
th century to the 1990s.  Those 
                                                 
4 Almost half of the Basin’s surface water management areas are over-appropriated, i.e., authorized uses 
exceed mean annual flows. 
   7
institutions, summarized in the following section, provided for: the management of water 
distribution through the issuance of water use licenses; the allocation of Murray River 
flows among the States of South Australia, New South Wales, and Victoria; the 
construction and operation of water storage facilities to conserve and regulate river flows; 
and in the latter decades of the century, moratoriums on the issuance of water licenses, 
and ultimately a cap on diversions from the Murray-Darling system. 
A second (though related) major Basin management issue is salinity.  For 
climatological and geological reasons, much of Australia’s soils store quantities of salt.  
In many irrigated areas, the application of water to the soil has elevated the concentration 
of salts in the underground water table and in surface water channels draining irrigated 
land.  Compared with this irrigation-related salinity, however, a much larger and more 
difficult challenge is “dryland salinity.”  A European model of land clearing for 
agricultural development was followed in Australia in the late 19
th and 20
th centuries.  It 
has been estimated that 15 billion trees, which used to transpire the saline water their 
roots drew from the aquifers, were removed from the Murray-Darling Basin alone.   
Saline groundwater levels in these areas have risen closer to the surface, sterilizing 
productive land in some places and boosting river salinities through surface runoff 
pathways.  Currently it is estimated that 7 million hectares of Australia are affected by 
dryland salinity, and the National Land & Water Resources Audit projects that without 
intervention this will rise to around 17 million hectares by the year 2050. 
There are other aspects of water quality deterioration in the Basin.  Awareness of 
the impaired status of aquatic and riparian species and habitat in much of the Basin has 
risen since the 1970s and reached a level of concern in the outset of the 21
st century that 
nearly matches that for water scarcity.  In response to growing evidence of a decline in 
river health, the Murray-Darling Basin Commission sponsored work to bring together 
current studies and knowledge and to inform the debate on restoration of river health.  
The results (Norris et al 2001) showed, among other things, that: 
 
•  38 percent of the river length assessed had biota that was significantly impaired; 
•  10 per cent of the river length was found to be severely impaired, having lost at 
least 50 percent of the types of aquatic invertebrates expected to occur there; 
•  Over 95 percent of the river length assessed in the Murray-Darling Basin has an 
environmental condition that is degraded and 30 per cent is substantially modified 
from the original condition. 
 
This has set the scene for what the Basin Commission has termed the Living 
Murray initiative, which is a concerted attack on the issue of failing river health of the 
Murray River.  The States were already addressing environmental flows in other streams 
in the Basin, but were slower to address the Murray itself because its highly regulated 
nature as a transboundary river limits the options for modifying flows.  Susbstantial 
reductions of water diversions for consumptive uses are expected to be necessary in order 
to achieve the meaningful ecological restoration envisioned by the Living Murray 
initiative.  Currently, there is a major focus of debate in Australia concerning the need to 
recover a proportion of water now allocated to agriculture and to re-assign it to the   8
maintenance of river health.
5  “The new competition for water is river health versus 
extraction of water for economic gain, and the nation is currently engaged in substantial 
debate on this issue within the Murray-Darling Basin” (Haisman 2003: 32). 
In addition, the Murray-Darling Basin contains wetlands, lakes, and forests of 
substantial natural and cultural—even international—significance (Goss 2003: 1).  The 
Macquarie Marshes are covered by the Ramsar Agreement on Wetlands of International 
Significance, to which Australia is a signatory.  The first step of the Living Murray 
initiative is focused on the restoration of adequate water supplies for six “significant 
ecological assets” located along the Murray identified by the Murray-Darling Basin 
Ministerial Council: the Barmah-Millewa forest, the Gunbower and Koondrook-
Perricoots forests, the Chowilla floodplain, the Hattah lakes, the River Murray channel, 
and the Murray Mouth including the Coorong and Lower lakes. 
    Thus, the current array of basin management issues in the Murray-Darling case 
includes water supply allocation, limiting water use, arresting and reversing water quality 
degradation, and restoring and protecting ecological values.  Engaged with these issues 
are various stakeholders including 
 
•  irrigators and irrigation organizations such as irrigation associations, companies, 
districts, and trusts; 
•  water suppliers for urban and rural communities such as utilities, local 
government departments, and water companies; 
•  catchment management bodies representing community-based natural resource 
management interests at the sub-basin level; 
•  the states of South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland, plus 
the Australian Capital Territory (encompassing Canberra), with their respective 
ministers and departments relating to environment, agriculture, and natural 
resources; and 
•  the Commonwealth of Australia (the Australian national government) and its 
ministers and departments relating to environment, agriculture, and natural 
resources. 
 
Section 7 will characterize the interests and motivations of these major 
stakeholders as well as other participants in the institutional arrangements for governing 
and managing the Murray-Darling Basin, but first it is necessary to connect these 
stakeholders and these basin management issues with the institutional arrangements that 
have been developed in the basin. 
 
6. Institutional Arrangements for Basin Management 
The institutional arrangements in the Murray-Darling Basin have evolved through three 
major stages: 
                                                 
5 Assuming the resumption of property rights from agriculture was accompanied by compensation 
payments, the total cost could be in excess of $2 billion. 
   9
•  an intergovermental agreement allocating water flows of the Murray River and 
providing for the construction and operation of infrastructure on the River, 
benefitting the three states (South Australia, New South Wales, and Victoria); 
•  the extension of the scope and structure of the intergovermental arrangements to 
the Darling River, as disputes among the States over river flows and water quality 
escalated, and unilateral state actions were implemented to restructure irrigation 
schemes and to limit water uses; 
•  the emergence of integrated water resource management in the Basin with new 
organizational structures and relationships at the sub-basin and basin scales, and 
with leadership and financial support from the national government as well as the 
State governments. 
 
The history of the development of these arrangements is recounted in Haisman 
(2003), as well as others (e.g., Challen 2000, Goss 2003, Heinmiller 2004).  Here the 
focus is on the current array of institutional arrangements in the Basin.  Two tables 
follow, which attempt to summarize and portray the Murray-Darling Basin arrangements.  
Table 1 is arranged by organization—governmental levels (national, state, and local) and 
water management bodies (commissions, boards, authorities)—showing the water 
management functions of each. 
 
Table 1. Water Management Functions in the Murray-Darling Basin, Australia 
 




Established by Constitution of 1901.  The Commonwealth under its external 
affairs power can make decisions in relation to the environment – for 
example, as a signatory to an international agreement on the environment, 
the Commonwealth stopped the construction of the Franklin Dam in 
Tasmania.  Another water function granted to the national government is in 
respect to navigation as part of interstate commerce.  Otherwise, the 
Commonwealth does not manage either intrastate or interstate water uses or 
regulate water quality - these are functions of the States. 
In partnership with the States, the Commonwealth exercises some policy 
development and coordination functions through the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG), and this has included setting a national water policy 
reform agenda (1994) and a National Water Initiative (2004). 
Commonwealth is an essential source of governmental funding for the 
States, which cannot impose customs or excise duties or income taxes. 
During World War II States also ceded their income taxing powers to the 
national government.  The Commonwealth provides funds to the States that 
support the national interest in natural resource management functions.  It 
also provides funds to sub-state water management entities such as 
catchment management boards or authorities. 
The Commonwealth is a party to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, 
participates on the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council and the 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission, and provides a significant portion of the 
funding for the Commission and its activities in the Basin. 
Where Commonwealth and State powers/legislation overlap, the 
Commonwealth takes precedence.   10
State 
governments 
Full sovereign powers over land, water and natural resources. 
State law typically vests authority for the control and use of water in a 
ministry. This Ministry is responsible for water rights systems etc. 
Built and still owns and operates major dams on rivers.  Initially built and 
operated irrigation schemes, although with the exception of Victoria, these 
are now all privatized. 
Oversees, and to some degree finances, water supply and sanitation 
functions of Local Governments. 
Territory 
governments 
The Constitution allows the Commonwealth to make laws on any subject for 
Territories ‘surrendered’ by the States or acquired by the Commonwealth.  
The Commonwealth has conferred a large measure of self government on 
three of the Territories, namely the Australian Capital Territory, Norfolk 
Island and the Northern Territory. 
Local 
governments 
(urban and rural) 
Established and authorized by state legislation.  Provide and operate water 
supply and sanitation infrastructure, with state government financial 
assistance in many circumstances.  (Rural domestic water supply systems 
are rare, though, with landholders generally responsible for their own water 
supply). 
Flood protection, with state financial assistance and in adherence to state 




Composed of ministers from the State and Commonwealth governments and 
a representative from the Australian Capital Territory, it is the policy 
making body for the Murray-Darling Basin under the provisions of the 1992 
Murray-Darling Basin Agreement.  This Agreement has the force of law, by 
virtue of having been enacted as a law within each participating jurisdiction.  
The Council takes a consensus approach in order to achieve unanimous 





The Commission is the executive body for implementing Council’s 
decisions on Basin policy and management.  It also advises the Ministerial 
Council on Basin conditions and concerns.  The Commission consists of 
representatives from each Basin government and is supported by staff and 
operations are funded under the cooperative agreement among the 








This body advises the Ministerial Council, representing the interests and 
concerns of local communities and stakeholder groups throughout the basin.  
On major policy issues, the Ministerial Council typically receives two 
reports—one from the Commission and one from the CAC. 
River Murray 
Water 
A “ring-fenced” business operation of the Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission, River Murray Water controls the flows of the transboundary 
Murray River as a bulk supplier, operating infrastructure facilities on the 
main stem of the river to assure the States of New South Wales, Victoria, 
and South Australia of their flows under provisions of the 1914 River 




Carrying slightly different titles from one State to another, these are mostly 
coordinating and advisory sub-basin and sub-State bodies with 
responsibility for protecting water quality and riparian and floodplain   11
Committees/ 
Authorities 
conditions through efforts to improve land stewardship and through actions 




These are community-based advisory committees composed primarily of 
water users; in some instances they are components of the Catchment 
Management Committees.  They advise on water allocations, environmental 
flows, and in some cases flood protection, river facility operations, and/or 





These are governmental, corporatized water suppliers managing all aspects 
of bulk water provision for municipalities and operating irrigation schemes 
(including major dams off the main stem of the Murray).  They are virtually 
self-sufficient financially and set their own water prices. 
Irrigation 
companies 
These are the fully privatized bodies operating in all States but Victoria, to 
which previously governmental irrigation infrastructure assets and 
operations have been transferred.  They are subject to corporations law, and 
stand alone in all respects financially. 
Water user 
groups 
These have been around for decades, and take multiple forms.  Nearly every 
river has at least one.  Though none have formal powers, some are quite 
influential.  They receive some assistance from state governments because 
they play an important role in community participation, and in some 
instances even perform duties that would otherwise have to be performed by 
government—e.g., creating a roster of water users and uses on an otherwise 
unregulated river. 
 
To capture some of the key ways in which institutional arrangements in the Basin 
shifted since the 1980s, Table 2 maps the organizational arrangements in the Murray-
Darling Basin differently, by function.  For each function listed in the cells of the left 
column, the corresponding cells of the other columns illustrate pre- and post-1980 
organizational structures, stakeholder consultation practices, and financing arrangements.  
Because states can assign and organize responsibilities differently, and since listing the 
arrangements in each of the four states plus the Australian Capital Territory would make 
the table excessively complicated and tedious, Table 2 concentrates on the two largest 
states in the basin, New South Wales and Victoria. 
 
Table 2. Functions in New South Wales and Victoria, Pre- and Post-1980 (see note at 
the bottom of the table) 
 
New South Wales  Victoria  Function 





All done from 
Sydney.  No staff 
located in country. 
 





No costs recovered 
Only policy and 
some technical 
specialists in 
Sydney.  Others in 
country under 
Regional Directors. 
Water sharing plans 
prepared by water 
management 
committees. 










Only policy and some 
technical specialists in 
Melbourne.   Other 
work is split between 
regional offices or 




Management Councils   12
other than admin – 
















Tribunal (IPART).   
WRM costs 
recognized above 









admin – eg 
license fees. 
 
and Rural Water 
Authorities have 
Board and Water 
Service Committees 
for stakeholder input 
and decision-making. 
 
Regarded as public 















formed as internal 
ring-fenced 
business to manage 
headworks.   







State Water has 
Customer Service 
Committees in each 
valley. 
 
IPART has set price 
path to full cost 
recovery by June 
2004. 
















Board and Water 
Service Committees 
for stakeholder input 
and decision-making. 
 
Full recovery of O+M 
and renewals.  Initial 
limited capital grants 
by govt for 





All operations and 
maintenance 
(O&M) staff 




All schemes had 
appointed water 
Fully privatized; 
only state mgmt is 

































but are receiving 
for up to 10 years 































Pricing based on 
property taxes.  
Cross-subsidies 
common. 








Pricing based on 
metered supplies.  
Cross-subsidies 
removed. 

















disbanded in favor of 
smaller number of 







Pricing based on 
metered supplies. 
Cross-subsidies 
removed.  Urban 
water authorities 
















Owners of levees 
pay a license fee.  
Costs of local 
government 
programs covered 
in general property 









Levee fees still 
apply.  Attempts by 
















levees pay a 
license fee.  

























taxes started but 
rescinded.   14
 
Note: 
Policy-making and implementation authority appears in regular font. 
Stakeholder or public consultation appears in italics. 
Financing appears underlined.  
 
Four key contextual elements are important in understanding these arrangements 
more fully. 
1.  Australian federalism and the sovereign role of the States—Basin management 
has evolved and been organized in the Murray-Darling case in ways that distinctly 
reflect the nature of Australia’s federal constitutional arrangements.  As noted 
briefly in Table 1, the Australian constitution devolves nearly all domestic policy 
matters to the states, with very limited authority for the commonwealth, or 
national government.  This is essential to bear in mind, in order to understand that 
although there have been elements of river management in the Murray-Darling 
Basin for nearly a century, management organizations and functions there have 
never been unified on the river basin scale or uniform across states.  Water use 
licenses in the Basin are not granted by the Murray-Darling Basin Commission or 
any other basin-scale organization, but by each state or territory.  The same is true 
of water discharge licenses.  The same is true of the creation and authorization of 
all forms of sub-basin organizations such as water management committees, 
catchment management bodies, irrigation companies, so that each state in the 
Basin contains a different combination of water management organizations.  The 
policy-making body for the Basin—the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial 
Council—operates with a unanimity rule such that each state (and the 
Commonwealth) can block basin policy with which it disagrees by withholding its 
assent. 
2.  Restructuring of sub-basin organizations and state and national ministries—
Prompted by substantial fiscal problems in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and 
informed by a variety of viewpoints (including the rise of Thatcherism in Britain), 
the states undertook a very thorough examination and reorganization of water 
provision and water management operations in the 1980s.  The essence of the 
reorganizations was this: publicly provided services for which fees could be 
collected should be either corporatized (turned into governmental bodies that were 
financially self-sufficient—“ring fenced”—by performing services for fees and 
maintaining their own assets) or fully privatized.  States and territories were 
encouraged to undertake such reforms by the Commonwealth government, which 
offered financial incentives (tranche payments) for the adoption of measures 
consistent with an initiative known as the National Competition Policy intended 
to improve public-sector efficiency in Australia.  As noted in Table 2, states such 
as Victoria and New South Wales changed the organization and financing of 
functions such as headworks operation, bulk water supply for irrigation or 
municipalities, delivery of urban water services.  Even the operation of the 
infrastructure assets on the Murray River stem was turned over to a ring-fenced 
entity within the Commission, known as River Murray Water (see Table 1).   
These changes are important not only in their own right (since they have assisted 
in the transition to water pricing and cost recovery practices more nearly   15
consistent with contemporary principles), but also because they facilitated a round 
of other changes to state ministries and commonwealth departments.  Once the 
construction, operation, and maintenance of infrastructure and the provision of 
services such as water supply had been removed from state or commonwealth-
level departments of water resources (leaving them largely with planning and 
regulatory functions), a next step in most states and at the commonwealth level 
was the combining of water resource departments or ministries with other natural 
resource or environmental departments that encompassed portfolios such as 
agriculture, land use planning, forestry, and fisheries.  Although by no means 
smooth and seamless, it does appear that these changes at the department and 
ministry level have facilitated a policy shift toward integrated resource 
management that takes into account the interactive effects of land development 
and use with water quality with riverine species and habitat or other aspects of 
natural resources.  On a political level, such changes also attenuated the 
relationship between water agencies and traditional water constituencies (such as 
irrigators), making it easier for water planners and policymakers to contemplate 
and ultimately enact changes such as capping water diversions for the sake of 
protecting environmental values. 
3.  Emergence of national level leadership on water policy, with state consent—
Although the Commonwealth government itself lacks the constitutional authority 
to make and enforce water resource policy, national level policy leadership in 
Australia (with respect to water and several other issues) has grown substantially 
over the past half century, and especially during the 1990s and 2000s.  The seeds 
of this change were sown in World War II, when the states surrendered their 
income taxing powers to the Commonwealth, which ever since has collected 
income taxes on a nationwide basis and distributed the revenue back to the states 
(and Territories).  The Commonwealth’s superior financial position has allowed it 
to accumulate some leverage with the otherwise sovereign States, by offering 
financial incentives to states to conform with policy directions approved by the 
Commonwealth.  The National Competition Policy mentioned in the previous 
paragraph is an example.  Another instrument of strengthened national-level 
policymaking is the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). COAG is the 
peak intergovernmental forum in Australia, comprising the Prime Minister, State 
Premiers, Territory Chief Ministers and the President of the Australian Local 
Government Association (ALGA).  COAG is a body that sets a national policy 
agenda for Australia.  COAG’s influence in the Murray-Darling Basin has been 
clear and profound, as the Council adopted in 1994 a National Water Policy 
Reform initiative, which it has revisited and revised in 2003-2004 and labeled the 
National Water Initiative (NWI).  Key elements of the National Water Initiative 
are 
 
•  As far as possible, separating resource management and regulatory roles of 
government from water service provision. 
•  Greater local-level responsibility for water resource management. 
•  Greater public education about water use and consultation in implementing water 
reforms.   16
•  Research into water use efficiency technologies and related areas.  
•  Consumption-based volumetric pricing and full cost recovery for water services, 
with removal or transparency of cross-subsidies.  
•  New investments in irrigation schemes or extensions of existing ones are to be 
undertaken only being appraised for economic viability and ecological 
sustainability. 
•  State and territory governments are to implement comprehensive systems of water 
allocations or entitlements, which are to be backed by the separation of water 
property rights from land and include clear specification of entitlements in terms 
of ownership, volume, reliability, transferability and, if appropriate, quality. 
•  The formal determination of water allocations or entitlements includes allocations 
for the environment as a legitimate user of water. 
•  Promotion of water trading (including across state and territory borders) of water 
allocations and entitlements to the extent feasible within the social or physical and 
ecological constraints of catchments. 
 
  State and territorial achievements in the enactment of these reforms could be 
rewarded by the Commonwealth with tranche payments. 
 
4.  Renegotiation of the River Murray Agreement and its expansion into the Murray-
Darling Basin Initiative— In 1985 the three state governments and the national 
government began negotiations on a new agreement.  In 1988 the Murray-Darling 
Basin Commission (MDBC) was formed under a new Murray-Darling Basin 
Agreement (MDBA) and took over this transboundary water management role 
plus took on a new responsibility for coordinating integrated catchment 
management across the whole basin.  “The charter of the new agreement was ‘to 
promote and co-ordinate effective planning and management for the equitable, 
efficient and sustainable use of the water, land and other environmental resources 
of the Murray-Darling Basin.” (Goss 2003: 2)  Queensland and the Australian 
Capital Territory were integrated into the new arrangements, which included the 
three organizations mentioned in Table 1—the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial 
Council (the political or policy-making body), the Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission (the administrative body), and the Community Advisory Committee 
(the community stakeholder consultative body). 
 
With these contextual elements in place, and with the organizational and 
functional features arrayed in Tables 1 and 2, it is possible (albeit at a high level of 
generalization) to sum up the current state of policy and institutional arrangements in the 
Basin.  As characterized by Goss (2003: 6):  
Water management arrangements in the Murray-Darling Basin have evolved from 
a focus on managing rivers for water quantity and security of supply (to “drought-proof” 
agricultural development), to integrated catchment management designed to maintain 
both water quantity and water quality and better balance water use for human 
consumption with that required to maintain healthy riverine systems.  Governments in the 
Murray-Darling have made a conscious effort over time to adapt their arrangements to 
address weaknesses in dealing with emerging issues such as water scarcity and salinity,   17
or to address instances where the arrangements have contributed to such resource 
degradation. 
  This transition is manifested in particular policy statements developed and 
adopted by the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council.  The Council’s Natural 
Resource Management Strategy, adopted in 1990, explicitly embraced integrated 
catchment management as the basis for resource management in the Basin.  The 
Ministerial Council and the Community Advisory Committee jointly adopted a further 
policy statement in 2001, “Integrated Catchment Management in the Murray-Darling 
Basin 2001-2010: Delivering a Sustainable Future,” with which all Council strategies and 
actions are to be harmonized. 
The states in turn have all established forms of decentralized catchment 
management bodies over the past 15–20 years, as noted in Table 1, creating bodies with a 
mandate to advise on all aspects of natural resource management.  States have, however, 
balked at giving these bodies too much authority—in particular the power to raise their 
own funds through land taxes.  The arguments against more autonomous catchment 
management authorities that are empowered to make management decisions and raise 
land taxes come down to: 
 
•  protests from landowners, especially farmers, about the cost imposed; 
•  concerns about creating a fourth tier of government; and 
•  opposition from local governments that fear encroachments upon their planning 
functions. 
 
The states’ reluctance to empower the catchment management bodies with 
autonomous revenue authority has to some degree been overcome by the national 
government’s decision to disburse funds for natural resource management directly to 
properly constituted catchment management authorities under the National Action Plan 
for Salinity and Water Quality, and the Natural Heritage Trust programs. 
    As of 2004, the institutional arrangements for governing and managing the 
Murray-Darling Basin have been modified in substantial ways.  The state governments 
and the Murray-Darling Basin organizations have been supplemented at the sub-basin 
level with catchment management bodies that are still developing their own role in land, 
water, and natural resource management.  At the national level, the Council of Australian 
Governments and the Commonwealth government have become intensively involved in 
the development of national water policy reforms and initiatives that in some respects 
lead and in other respects follow the integrated water resource management direction 
taken during the 1990s by the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council.  COAG’s latest 
set of proposals, published June 25, 2004, would push a number of reforms to water 
licensing, water trading, and the enhancement of environmental water flows along much 
further.  The course of water policy reform and basin management in the Murray-Darling 
case thus reflects a combination of participants’ motivations and institutional incentives 
and constraints. 
 
7. Participants’ Motivations, Incentives, and Actions 
In the institutional arrangements for governing and managing the Murray-Darling Basin, 
there are several key participants or groups of participants.  Some are key water user   18
groups, such as irrigators and urban water suppliers.  Others are participants with formal 
roles in the Murray-Darling Basin institutional structure, such as the departments and 
ministries of the member States, the national government, and the Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission members and staff. 
    However measured, irrigation is a very large stakeholder group in the Murray-
Darling Basin, but it is not a strictly homogenous group.  Some irrigators are crop 
farmers (especially in New South Wales and Queensland) who have favored a fairly 
liberal granting of water licenses.  They have been willing to accept less security and 
more variability in their water deliveries.  On the other hand, there are irrigators with 
permanent plantings (orchards and vineyards, especially in South Australia and Victoria, 
also true to some extent of dairy farmers) with high capital investments.  These irrigators 
have favored more restrictive granting of water licenses in order to maximize the security 
of water deliveries to license holders.  On policy decisions such as state moratoria on 
granting licenses or the basin “cap” on diversions, these categories of irrigators had 
different interests—the former opposing and the latter generally supporting such 
decisions. 
    The irrigators have been more nearly united, however, in their opposition to the 
idea of real reductions in water licenses and diversions for environmental protection—for 
instance, as part of the “Living Murray” initiative.  Irrigators with water licenses 
generally do not want them reduced or restricted from current levels in order to restore 
“river health,” which some regard as a rather abstract notion. 
    State and Commonwealth policy makers promoting the Living Murray initiative 
might be able to reduce irrigator resistance by offering expanded water trading, so that 
irrigators with insufficient water allocations might be able to acquire water from those 
with more than adequate allocations.  Water trading is and has been allowed in each of 
the states on the River Murray—in South Australia since 1988, in Victoria since 1989, 
and in New South Wales since 1990.
6  However, other institutional aspects of Murray-
Darling water management have placed substantial limits on the scope of water trading.  
Since water licenses are issued by state governments, trading has been essentially limited 
to transactions taking place within a state.  Furthermore, many water licenses are issued 
to schemes (irrigation districts, trusts, or companies) rather than to individuals, and in 
those cases trading among individuals depends upon the rules of the scheme rather than 
the rules of the state.  In some schemes, shares or votes correspond with water 
allocations, and the rules of the scheme may restrict a user’s ability to trade water. 
    In order to overcome some of these barriers and expand the scope of water trading 
(thus perhaps reducing irrigators’ resistance to the Living Murray initiative), the Council 
of Australian Governments (COAG) in June 2004 proposed the elimination of restrictions 
on water trading across states, and further proposed the elimination of restrictions on 
water trades out of irrigation schemes (i.e., allowing a member of an irrigation scheme to 
sell or lease water entitlements to non-members) (COAG 2004).  If enacted in law, these 
proposals would mark a significant step toward the creation of a basin-wide water trading 
marketplace. 
    In addition to bargaining for more flexibility (e.g., in the form of expanded water 
trading), irrigators have used their resistance to reduced water diversions to bargain for 
                                                 
6 Australia Farm News (n.d.) “Water Trading and Pricing.” [www.farmweb.au.com/h2o/h2use9.html, 
accessed 3 September 2004].   19
other concessions from state and Commonwealth governments.  One is for permanent 
water entitlements, replacing water licenses of limited duration.  In other words, irrigators 
have signaled a willingness to accept some reductions in water entitlement quantities in 
exchange for a lengthening of water license existence.  COAG also supported this change 
in June 2004 (COAG 2004).  Also, financial support for water-use efficiency 
improvements, infrastructure refurbishment, etc., and the perpetuation of some subsidies 
for agricultural water deliveries, has been a component of the political and financial price 
of implementing water use reductions. 
    Urban water suppliers in the Murray-Darling Basin appear to have moved closer 
to full cost recovery, and their rates have encouraged conservation by their customers.  
Thus the prospect of reduced water diversions does not alarm urban water suppliers to the 
same degree it does irrigators.  Rather, urban suppliers’ concern is with financial 
soundness—maintaining adequate revenues while per capita and per household “sales” of 
water decline.  Further rate increases are only a partial solution—at some point in any 
locality, political pressure will build against further increases.  River health is not 
necessarily a prime concern for urban suppliers, but they can accommodate it as long as it 
does not affect their financial situation adversely. 
    Another important set of participants in the Basin are the state ministries related 
to water and other natural resources.  Their paramount interests appear to be (a) 
maintaining state autonomy, (b) receiving Commonwealth tranche payments for 
following or implementing national competition policy initiatives, and (c) protecting their 
constituents in negotiations concerning Basin policies.  The combination of these motives 
leaves state ministries wanting to do enough to keep Commonwealth support flowing and 
to prevent encroachments on their autonomy, but not necessarily any more than that. 
The reliance upon consensus as a decision rule in the Ministerial Council allows 
each state (and the Commonwealth) to block decisions or actions with which it disagrees.  
Another dimension of this consensus rule, however, may be that in order to overcome 
potential vetoes by each participating government, states and the Commonwealth have 
allowed one another to delay implementation of basin policy or follow a different 
practice.  This is plainly seen with the cap on diversions, where the council agreed to the 
policy but Queensland and ACT have taken another five years without yet determining 
their cap amounts,
 7 and New South Wales has calculated its cap differently from Victoria 
or South Australia (in ways that make New South Wales appear not to be in violation of 
the cap).  Such deviations from adoption or implementation of the “consensus” policy 
may be a pragmatic way of overcoming the obstacles to policy making ordinarily posed 
by a unanimity rule. 
Commonwealth participants have interests of their own, too, of course.  Among 
other things, each Commonwealth ministry that participates in the Murray-Darling 
structure is interested in keeping its own role and its own policy sector (e.g., agriculture, 
environment) represented in deliberations and free from encroachment by others—a sort 
of horizontal bureaucratic positioning.  Equally intriguing, though, is the role of the 
Commonwealth governments as a whole, since a succession of them have sustained 
participation in, commitment to, and funding for the Murray-Darling institutions.  Why 
would the Commonwealth sustain such commitments to a set of institutions where it is 
                                                 
7 The two states combined divert no more than 7% of total water diverted in the Basin, however, making 
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basically treated as an equal with the states?  Here too the Commonwealth’s actions may 
be seen as a pragmatic option for addressing a combination of motives.  On the one hand, 
the Murray-Darling Basin is economically and politically significant enough to warrant 
the national government’s serious attention; on the other hand, that basin’s situation is 
distinct and should not necessarily be the basis for nationwide policies that would apply 
to other basins in Australia with different circumstances.  Having a basin-scale set of 
institutional arrangements in which the national government can participate, but which 
isolates decision making so decisions apply only to that basin, may satisfy the 
Commonwealth’s combination of interests in this regard. 
    The Murray-Darling Basin Commission is another key participant in Basin policy 
making and implementation.  Like any body, the Commission is able to enhance its 
influence on basin policy making by maximizing its resources (e.g., staff, budget), but in 
the particular context of the Murray-Darling Basin one of the commission’s key strengths 
is as a non-partisan adviser.  To maximize its legitimacy, the MDBC needs to provide 
support without perceived favoritism and bias, be the source of good “neutral science” 
and a source of sound advice on Basin policy questions.  By performing these roles, the 
MDBC maintains the support of the states and Commonwealth.  The commission staff 
are also interested in maintaining the commission’s relative prominence in Basin policy 
making, and not having resource management issues devolved completely to state and 
substate actors. 
Furthermore, Commission staff are heavily invested in the success of Basin 
management.  MDBC is a premier basin organization worldwide, visited, studied, and 
copied by many.  This prestige is likely a substantial motivator for Commission staff. 
 
8. Applying the Analytical Framework 
It is now possible to return to the analytical framework of Section 2 and review the 
factors identified there as potentially related to successful development of basin-scale 
decentralized institutional arrangements for integrated water resource management. 
 
8.1 Initial Conditions and Contextual Factors 
Initial conditions and contextual factors in the Murray-Darling were in most respects 
quite favorable to the development of new institutional arrangements leading toward 
integrated water resource management.  The level of economic development in the basin 
and in Australia as a whole has made it possible for stakeholders and governments to 
invest time and money into knowledge generation, travel, meetings, and other tasks 
associated with the planning, negotiation, adoption and implementation of institutions for 
river basin management.  There are few class, religious, or other socio-cultural 
distinctions keeping Australians throughout the basin from being able to establish 
communications, information sharing, or the making and keeping of agreements (where 
issues exist efforts are being made to resolve these – for example Indigenous Action 
Plans are being developed in relation to natural resources management in the Basin).  
Overall, the Murray-Darling Basin was quite favorable social and economic terrain for 
the development of Basin management institutions: its semi-arid climate makes water   21
issues significant enough to stimulate action, and the relative wealth and homogeneity of 
its population present few barriers to such action. 
The initial distribution of resources among Basin stakeholders clearly has favored 
irrigators in the basin, who account for more than 90% of water diversions.  This has not 
stymied the emergence of basin-scale institutions or the development of integrated water 
resource management, but it has slowed the pace of reforms such as licensing restrictions 
and cost-recovery pricing, with the latter driven more by national economic policy 
reforms than by internal basin-scale reform efforts.  Indeed, national reform efforts 
articulated through COAG have provided helpful leverage to policy actors within the 
Murray-Darling basin trying to enact and implement restrictions on water diversions and 
the reduction of agricultural water subsidies.  Current reform efforts oriented toward 
implementation of the Living Murray initiative have entailed several concessions toward 
irrigation interests, as noted in Section 7 above.  Thus, irrigators’ position has affected 
the shape and speed of institutional reform in the Murray-Darling basin. 
 
8.2 Characteristics of the Decentralization Process 
If anything, the construction of basin management institutions and policies in the Murray-
Darling basin has been as much or more a matter of integration as it has been 
decentralization.  Concerns that might arise in other countries about the ability or 
willingness of the central government to genuinely devolve decision making authority are 
of little consequence in Australia, where primary decision making authority 
predominantly and initially rested at the sub-basin level with the state governments.  Over 
time, and with the cooperation and consent of the national government, the states have 
constructed intergovernmental arrangements to control and operate Murray River flows 
and then to address other issues. 
  Central-level  recognition  of  Basin  governance and management has been 
complete and consistent.  The Commonwealth government not only recognizes, but 
participates in and helps to fund, the Basin-scale organizations such as the Ministerial 
Council and the Commission.  Through financial incentives offered to the states and to 
substate catchment management authorities, and through establishment of and 
participation in bodies such as the Council of Australian Governments, the national 
government has actively encouraged the development of integrated water resource 
management in the Murray-Darling Basin.  These commitments from the national 
government have remained consistent across elections and changes in party control. 
 
8.3 Central-Local Relationships and Capacities 
Only two of the factors in this component of the analytical framework are less than 
favorable to successful integrated water management at the basin level.  One is the past 
and current system of water rights.  As noted already, entitlements to the use of water are 
not issued by any basin-scale or larger entity, but by each state and there are differences 
and similarities among the states’ rules governing water entitlements (e.g., with respect to 
duration, security, and transferability).  Rights generally fall into three categories: 
licenses issued to organizations such as irrigation companies, trusts, or districts, licenses 
issued to individuals, and rights of riparian landowners.  Each state has arguably over-  22
allocated water licenses as it responded to economic development pressures to expand 
agricultural production and facilitate community growth, and this over-allocation now 
represents one of the principal challenges of basin management in the Murray-Darling 
case.  Groundwater still has uncertain status in the water licensing arrangements of the 
states in the Murray-Darling Basin and has not been fully integrated into the licensing 
system.  Overall, then, the systems of water entitlements in the basin continue to require 
further reform if measures such as water trading and the protection of environmental 
flows are to be implemented fully in the Murray-Darling case. 
    Also, the organizations in the Basin most directly associated with integrated 
resource management (eg., the sub-basin catchment management authorities) have 
virtually no financial resources of their own and are for all practical concerns completely 
dependent on funding contributed to them by the State and Commonwealth governments.  
There is nothing formally to prevent a future Commonwealth or State government from 
changing its policy and withdrawing its financial support.  However unlikely this may be, 
it nevertheless represents an aspect of the institutional arrangements in the Murray-
Darling case that our analytical framework would identify as a potential problem. 
    All other factors with respect to central and local (or basin-level) relationships and 
capacities are quite favorable to the successful and sustainable implementation of 
integrated water resource management in the Murray-Darling Basin case.  Especially 
noteworthy is the basin management participants’ ability to create and modify the 
institutional arrangements to meet their needs and circumstances.  The States and the 
Commonwealth governments have amended and even completely replaced the 
agreements for the Murray River and the Murray-Darling Basin during their existence, 
and have reconstituted the basin governance arrangements to their current structure of 
Ministerial Council, Commission, and Community Advisory Committee.  Furthermore, 
the participants retain the authority to make other changes in the future.  Interviews with 
basin management participants indicated that issues of structure, capacity, and 
representativeness are contemplated and discussed on a recurring basis. 
  Another  very  favorable  factor has been the extent of experience at the local and 
state levels with self-governance and service provision.  A specific example here can help 
illustrate the advantageous position of the Murray-Darling Basin.  Curtis, Schindler, and 
Wright (2002) have pointed out that the adoption of integrated catchment management 
approaches with active community participation was helped considerably by the 
existence of and experience with Landcare groups since 1986, and the provision of 
Commonwealth funding for improved land and other resource management practices 
through the Natural Heritage Trust program beginning in 1988.  By the time the Murray-
Darling Basin Ministerial Council adopted its Natural Resource Management Strategy in 
1990, there were already numerous sub-basin groups addressing issues of improved land 
stewardship.
8  Combining these landcare groups with the existence already of local 
                                                 
8 “By 1998, there were 900 Landcare groups operating across Victoria [alone] with an estimated 
membership of 27,500.  In those areas where a Landcare group operated, about 46 percent of the rural 
properties had a Landcare member.  Groups provide opportunities for learning by doing and through 
interaction with peers.  Group processes have enabled participants to discuss conflicting views in a 
reasonable fashion and have generally enhanced social cohesion, increased the capacity of rural 
communities to attract resources from governments, and better equipped them to respond to change.  With 
strong agency commitment to participatory processes, agency staff and Landcare members have established 
robust, productive partnerships and avoided many of the perils of co-option.  Landcare participation has   23
government councils, irrigation trusts and districts, and rural water authorities (in 
Victoria), one finds that participatory catchment management has been introduced into a 
situation already rich with social and organizational capital. 
 
8.4 Internal Basin-Level Institutional Arrangements 
In this category of the analytical framework as in the others, most of the factors to 
consider point toward very favorable conditions for successful and sustainable 
development of integrated resource management at the basin level.  There are basin-level 
governance organizations and sub-basin organizations, each with firm recognition and 
considerable support from the state and commonwealth governments.  The states 
themselves are recognized as communities of interest within the river basin, as are a 
number of stakeholder communities represented on the Community Advisory Committee.  
Basin users and policy makers appear to have a rich array of means by which to negotiate 
and enter into agreement for committing and combining resources for projects and 
programs to improve basin conditions.  Monitoring of Basin conditions is performed 
regularly and then consolidated into a Basin perspective by the Commission staff, in 
whom considerable confidence is voiced. 
    Two factors about the current institutional arrangements within the basin have 
less certain status—they are not necessarily negative, but they are less clearly positive.  
The clarity of institutional boundaries has been reduced somewhat by the introduction of 
the relatively new catchment management bodies.  Local governments within the basin 
are not entirely certain how the land and water management activities of these bodies will 
overlap with traditional land use regulatory authority of local governments.  Some basin-
level staff seemed unsure how coordination will occur between the new bodies’ water 
management activities and larger programs undertaken at the basin scale such as the 
Living Murray initiative.  These uncertainties may prove to be nothing more than 
temporary adjustments as each organization gets used to its role and relationships with 
the others, or it may prove more difficult than that—at this moment it is impossible to 
predict. 
Partly connected with this is the issue of conflict resolution arrangements.   
Arrangements exist and have been used to deal with conflicts between water users and 
conflicts between the states, but it is less clear how (meaning, by what process or through 
what body) conflicts would be addressed and resolved that arose between sub-state and 
sub-basin entities such as a local government and a catchment management body, or 
between catchment management bodies, or between a catchment management body and a 
rural water authority, etc.  Here too the uncertainty and concern may prove to be only 
temporary and inconsequential, but it is too soon to tell. 
                                                                                                                                                 
also increased awareness of issues and enhanced landholder skills and knowledge and contributed to 
increased adoption of best management practices… Recent evaluations of the [Natural Heritage Trust] 
suggest that government investment has been more than matched by community contributions.  Landcare 
participants are represented on regional [Catchment Management Committees] and other important fora 
and are contributing to important natural resource management decision making.  By enhancing citizen 
competency, providing continuity of community representation, and acting as a place of retained 
knowledge, Landcare groups and their emerging networks appear likely to bridge the gap between the 
demands of adaptive management and the limitations of stakeholder participation.” (Curtis, Shindler, and 
Wright 2002: 1209).   24
 
9. Performance Assessment 
A number of serious issues within the Murray-Darling River Basin have been identified, 
including water allocation (consumptive and environmental flows), water quality 
degradation (salinity and nutrients), and ecosystem health.  These have been commonly 
recognized as interdependent, so a number of key programs have been adopted in inter-
related fashion to address specific and general water resource problems. 
 
o  The Natural Resources Management Strategy (NRMS) was developed as an 
umbrella strategy to address many complex natural resource degradation issues on 
an integrated catchment management basis.  The NRMS focuses upon 
investigation and education to strengthen the knowledge and skill base.  The 
Integrated Catchment Management Policy Statement is a commitment by the 
community and governments of the MDB to do all that needs to be done to 
manage and use the resources of the Basin in a way that is ecologically 
sustainable.  It includes all resources, land, water, and riverine environment. 
o  The Living Murray initiative discussed earlier involves a vision of a “…healthy 
River Murray system, sustaining communities and preserving unique values.” 
(MDMBC 2002, p.5) This seven-year program features principles of adaptive 
management based around annual and detailed reviews of river health.  The 
Sustainable Rivers Audit will serve as a regular assessment of river health and 
ecological condition. This audit also includes performance indicators for 
macroinvertebrates, fishes, water quality, hydrology, and physical habitat.     
o  Steadily increasing diversions from the rivers of the Basin, raised concerns that 
basin water resources were allocated andthat current levels of water use were 
unsustainable.  The MDB Ministerial Council commissioned an audit of water 
use, which provided the first comprehensive assessment of basin-wide water use 
on a consistent basis.  This revealed that median flow to the sea had been reduced 
79 percent from natural conditions by the high levels of diversions and that rates 
of growth in water diversions increased since 1988. The Independent Audit 
Groups’s 2000-01 review of cap implementation (MDMBC 2002) indicates that 
transparency in reporting concerning cap compliance is resulting in pressure upon 
communities that are not in compliance, as well as their governments.
9  T h e  
“Review of the Operation of the Cap” in 2002 concluded that the Cap is an 
essential first step in achieving a sustainable Basin ecosystem and that it has 
significantly reduced risk of environmental degradation. 
o  MDBC Salinity and Drainage Strategy arose from concerns about salinity and 
waterlogging problems along the Murray River with studies showing that the 
irrigation areas affected by high water tables could increase from 559,000 
hectares in 1985 to 869,000 hectares in 2015 (MDBMC, 1987).  Under the 15-
year strategy, States agreed to be responsible for actions taken after 1 January 
1988 significantly affecting river salinity.  A market in salt credits was set up, a 
salinity audit was carried out and a model of salt loads and concentrations was 
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developed along the main stem of the Murray River.  End-of-valley salinity 
targets were adopted for each tributary catchment to be achieved by 2015 and 
joint salinity interception schemes agreed upon to manage existing saline inflows. 
This Strategy has largely been successful (MDBC 1999c) in stemming salinity 
caused by irrigation. However, dryland salinity has continued to threaten to river 
quality.  
o  Initial response to the growing awareness of the magnitude of the dryland salinity 
problem was the National Dryland Salinity Research, Development & Extension 
Program (NSDP) established jointly by the Commonwealth and State 
Governments in 1993.  This Program is essentially a cooperative research effort to 
understand the nature of dryland salinity and to identify farm and other 
management practices that could either assist in remediation or, as a default 
option where nothing else will work, to identify productive uses of the saline 
landscape. 
o  The National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP) is a partnership 
plan between communities (mostly as represented by their catchment 
management bodies) and government to fund and manage specific actions such as 
tree planting etc.  The Commonwealth Government has pledged $700 million to 
be matched by the States and Territories in a $1,400 million program. The Plan, 
which builds on a number of existing programs, is an attempt to focus and 
coordinate national, regional and local efforts at managing dryland salinity and its 
consequences, including the salinization of rivers.  It takes a targets and standards 
approach to natural resources management, implemented through community-
based catchment planning and is augmented by research, incentives, governance 
and capacity building components of the Plan.  
o  The development of a massive 1000 km algal bloom in 1991-92 in the Darling 
River prompted increasing concern regarding eutrophication in the basin.  In 
1994, the MDBC adopted the Algal Management Strategy to reduce the frequency 
and intensity of algal blooms and other water quality problems associated with 
nutrient pollution in the Murray Darling River Basin, through a framework of 
coordinated planning and management actions.  Targets were established for 
phosphorus loads from the major subcatchments of the Basin to provide the 
framework for community catchment plans designed to reduce phosphorus.  Other 
actions were focused on improved flow regimes, heightened community 
awareness, and improved scientific knowledge. 
 
The MDBC and its stakeholders have shown commitment to understanding and 
taking proactive efforts to address critical issues in the basin through ongoing and reliable 
measurement, development of scientific knowledge, and an integrated and participatory 
approach - all expressed through basin- and sub-basin-scale initiatives.  In addition to 
considering the strategies and programs the MDBC has developed to alleviate basin 
problems, performance of basin management institutions can be assessed under headings 
that reflect some desirable institutional characteristics of decentralized water resource 
management.  These are Devolution of Authority; Stakeholder Participation; and 
Financial Self-Sufficiency.  The following assessments are necessarily broad, as different 
states have taken somewhat different approaches.   26
 
9.1 Devolution of Authority 
Water resource management is still driven by policy elites and audit groups in each State, 
but all actual management is carried out at regional levels in local offices with almost 
complete delegation for policy implementation including water sharing.  Management 
and operation of dams and irrigation schemes has been transferred to entities designed for 
completely localized day to day management, and for financial sustainability.  In all 
states but Victoria, this has included the privatization of irrigation schemes and their 
assets into the hands of the irrigators.  Urban water and floodplain management have 
always been local responsibilities, albeit with some central technical and financial 
assistance, and this has continued and intensified in both technical and financial aspects. 
 
9.2 Stakeholder Participation 
All levels of water management are now supported by stakeholder advisory groups of one 
kind or another.  This is complete in the case of privatized irrigation schemes where there 
is now no government involvement, but is also particularly well-developed for integrated 
catchment management.  The basin population has nearly 20 years’ experience in such 
community and government partnerships and brings a highly informed and sophisticated 
capability to the task.  Public consultation is now the norm even for urban water and 
wastewater projects in a manner that simply did not exist 20 years ago. 
 
9.3 Financial Self-Sufficiency 
The national water reform agenda articulated in 1994, and couched in terms of a national 
competition policy, placed considerable emphasis on water management moving onto a 
sound financial footing.  Economic elements of water reform policy required removal of 
cross-subsidies, consumption-based water pricing, new investments only if they were 
economically viable and ecologically sustainable, better specification of water 
entitlements, and the encouragement of water trading.  These reforms were accompanied 
by institutional reforms that separated regulatory roles from service provision, required 
greater local-level responsibilities for management, and encouraged public education and 
consultation. 
These reforms are advanced across the Basin.  Generally, both urban and rural 
(irrigation) water supply infrastructure now gets no government funding for operations 
and maintenance and a very small and steadily decreasing amount of capital funding.  
The concept of a renewals annuity has been accepted as part of the pricing structure to 
ensure the long-run sustainability of the asset base. 
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9.4 Other Perspectives on Strengths and Weaknesses of the Institutional Arrangements 
in the Murray-Darling Case 
Goss (2003) presents five criteria for sustainable river management: stable institutional 
organization formally recognized by means of a treaty, law, or agreement; a technical 
secretariat and stable funding; a sound knowledge base; integration; and transparency and 
community involvement.  He finds the arrangements in the Murray-Darling to have been 
strengthened substantially with respect to each criterion since the 1980s.  Chief among 
the achievements cited by Goss is the adoption of the Cap on Water Diversions, an 
agreement among the participants adopted by the Ministerial Council to arrest 
development of water use to 1994 levels, as a first step toward the restoration of river 
health. 
    Goss and others have, however, found some points of weakness in the Murray-
Darling arrangements.  These include:  
 
•  Frequent turnover of members on the Ministerial Council and on the Commission; 
•  The Murray-Darling Basin Commission lacks experts from outside government; 
•  The requirement of unanimity among Commission and Council members 
representing six governments, and for parliaments of all six governments to 
approve any changes to the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, slows decision 
making. 
•  Lack of representation on the Community Advisory Committee by some key 
industries affected by basin management, and the fact that many representatives 
on the CAC are government appointments. 
•  While understanding of basin issues, policy, and projects is relatively strong 
among Council, Commission, and CAC members, “broader stakeholder 
understanding of Basin-wide natural resource issues, Council and Commission 
structures and decision-making processes and Council policy decisions is often 
poor….  The Commission is allocating considerably more resources to improve 
community participation in its current initiatives.” (Goss 2003: 4) 
•  Urban interests, rural towns, women, and Aboriginal interests have been 
underrepresented on Catchment Management Councils, at least in Victoria 
(Curtis, Shindler, and Wright 2002: 1211) 
•  Demand management in the growing urban areas will need the kind of attention 




Management arrangements in the Murray-Darling Basin do not represent a simple 
template.  They are complex, they have a history that has shaped their current structure 
and direction, and they are tailored to the particular circumstances of Australian 
federalism and the climate and topography and basin management issues there.  While 
certain design elements might be transportable to other circumstances (a Community 
Advisory Committee, a funding formula, etc.), the overall structure has been crafted and 
modified over time to fit and adapt to this Basin.   28
Its fit, its complexity, and its adaptability are among its principal strengths, and help 
to explain the robustness of the Basin management institutions in the Murray-Darling 
case.  As noted in the preceding section, there are weaknesses and criticisms to be made 
of the Murray-Darling arrangements, but its successes in gaining intergovernmental 
cooperation and commitment, instituting mechanisms for stakeholder participation, and 
generating a trusted body of data about basin problems and conditions are considerable. 
    Today, the individuals and organizations in the Murray-Darling Basin 
management structure stand on the threshold of a new era, in terms of organizational 
arrangements and policy direction.  They are incorporating sub-basin catchment 
organizations into the framework for integrated water resource management, while 
leaving the basin-level organizations relatively unchanged for now.  They are also 
attempting to achieve an ambitious portfolio of ecological restoration objectives, in 
addition to but distinct from their past focus on balancing water supply and demand for 
human consumption.  And they undertake these efforts at a time when national-level 
bodies are becoming more actively involved in water policy, creating a national water 
policy framework into which the Murray-Darling will be expected to fit.  Over the next 
decade, these challenges will test further the robustness of the institutions for river basin 
governance and management in the Murray-Darling Basin. 
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Acronyms 
CAC    Community  Advisory  Committee 
 
COAG    Council  of  Australian  Governments 
 
MDBA     Murray-Darling Basin Agreement 
 
MDBC     Murray-Darling Basin Commission 
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Appendix: Variables in the Analytical Framework 
As noted in Section 2, the analytical framework used for this research project entails 
several variables hypothesized to be related to the success or failure of river basin 
management institutions, grouped into four categories. 
 
Contextual factors and initial conditions 
The literature on decentralized water resource management indicates that successful 
decentralization is at least partly a function of the initial conditions that prevail at the 
time a decentralization initiative is attempted.  These initial conditions are elements of the 
social context of the decentralization effort.  They include 
 
o  Economic development of the nation; 
o  Economic development of the basin area; 
o  Initial distribution of resources among basin stakeholders; and 
o  Class, religious, or other social/cultural distinctions among basin stakeholders. 
 
Characteristics of the decentralization process 
In countries that have attempted to decentralize water resource management to the basin 
level, characteristics of the decentralization process itself will affect the prospects for 
successful implementation.  Two necessary conditions of a decentralization initiative are 
(a) devolution of authority and responsibility from the center, and (b) acceptance of that 
authority and responsibility by the local or regional units.  Whether (a) and (b) occur will 
depend in part upon why and how the decentralization takes place.  Important factors 
include 
 
o  Whether basin-level management was a local initiative to assume management 
responsibilities, a devolution that was mutually desired by local stakeholders and 
central government officials, or a decision by central government officials to shed 
water resource management responsibilities regardless of whether basin 
stakeholders wanted to assume them; 
o  The extent of central-government recognition of local-level basin governance; 
and, 
o  Whether central government officials maintained a policy commitment to 
decentralization and basin management through transitions in central government 
administration. 
 
Characteristics of central government/basin-level relationships and capacities 
Because successful decentralization requires complementary actions at the central 
government and local levels, other aspects of the central-local relationship can be 
expected to condition that success.  Political and institutional variables should be   36
explored that relate to the respective capacities of the central government and the basin-
level stakeholders, and the relationship between them.  Key factors include 
 
o  The extent to which devolution of water management responsibilities from central 
government to basin institutions has been real or merely rhetorical, and whether 
devolution has been handled as a supportive transition to basin management or as 
an abrupt abandonment of central government authority; 
o  The financial resources available to basin-level institutions, and the extent of their 
financial autonomy; 
o  Basin management participants’ ability to create and modify institutional 
arrangements that are tailored to their needs and circumstances; 
o  The extent of other experience at the local or regional level within the country 
with self-governance and service provision; 
o  The distribution (particularly asymmetries) of national-level political influence 
among basin stakeholders; 
o  Characteristics of the water rights system in the country which facilitate or hinder 
basin management efforts; and 
o  Whether basin-level institutions have had adequate time for implementation and 
adaptation of basin management activities. 
 
The internal configuration of basin-level institutional arrangements 
Successful implementation of decentralized water resource management will also depend 
on features of the basin-level arrangements created by stakeholders and/or central 
government officials.  Important ones include 
 
o  The presence of basin-level governance institutions; 
o  The extent of clarity of institutional boundaries, and their match with basin 
boundaries; 
o  Whether and to what extent basin-level institutional arrangements recognize sub-
watershed communities of interest; 
o  The availability of forums for information sharing and communication among 
basin stakeholders; 
o  The ability to make, monitor, and enforce contingent contracts whereby basin 
stakeholders can agree to contribute to improvements in basin conditions; 
o  The institutionalization of regular monitoring of basin conditions by means that 
are trusted by water users; and 
o  The availability of forums for conflict resolution. 
 
Certainly, these factors will not all apply with equal significance in all cases.  In 
each case, the emergence and path of river basin management will be affected profoundly 
by some of these variables, affected slightly by others, and not at all by some.   
Institutional analysis in a case-study setting consists largely in determining which 
institutional factors in what combination appear to have been linked to outcomes.   
Furthermore, many of the variables listed above have subjective components, and will be   37
assessed differently by different participants and observers.  It is therefore essential in 
these case studies that team members interview individuals with a variety of perspectives. 
 
 